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Abstract 
Since 1950, there has been considerable diversity in developing country experiences. Some 
countries and some regions have experienced rapid growth and catch up, others have fallen 
behind. At a global level there is an increasing inequality of per capita incomes. However, 
within the framework of increasing inequality, some countries have experienced accelerated 
catch up. The speed of catch up in the successful countries is more rapid than in previous 
historical periods. This paper analyses the sources of success and failure in economic 
development in the post-war period. It applies a framework of proximate, intermediate and 
ultimate causality. Proximate factors refer to the directly quantifiable economic sources of 
growth, intermediate factors refer to demand and policies, ultimate sources refer to the 
deeper historical, cultural, geographic and institutional sources of development. Monocausal 
explanations of success and failure are rejected. However, amongst the various sources of 
growth, the paper places special emphasis on developing countries’ ability to tap into global 
knowledge flows. There is not a single example of successful catch up since 1868 which did 
not involve tapping into international technology. The extent to which countries can profit 
from international technology flows depends on their absorptive capacities, technological 
capabilities and systems of innovation.  
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1 Introduction 
Dynamism of developing countries 
During the last 60 years many myths about development have been exploded through sober 
empirical analysis and measurement of development trends. Developing countries are not 
inevitably condemned to poverty and stagnation. Life expectancy at birth has increased by 
some 25 years. Child mortality has declined and human capital has increased. Contrary to 
Malthusian predictions, food production has outpaced a rapidly growing global population, 
especially in densely populated developing countries. Developing countries are not locked 
into agriculture and mining. They can become powerful global players in manufacturing 
production and exports. Table 1 summarises a number of these dramatic changes. However, it 
also serves to highlight how many people are still living in dire poverty. 
 
Table 1 
Dynamic Changes in the Developing World, 1950-2005 
  1950-60 1981 2000-05
GDP per capita (1990 PPP$), 1950, 2003 854.9  3645.6
Food production per capita (1980 = 100) 88.0  147.0
Manufactured exports as % of commodity exports 6.0  53.0
Life expectancy at birth 40.8  65.4
Child mortality by age 1 180.0  65.0
Child mortality by age 5 281.0  95.0
Gross Enrolment Rate primary education 75.8  103.9
Gross Enrolment Rate secondary education 15.7  58.3
Gross Enrolment Rate tertiary education 2.1  13.0
Net Enrolment Rate primary education 48.1  82.0
Net Enrolment Rate secondary education 35.0  45.0
Percentage of population, with less than 1 dollar a day  40.4 21.1
Number of persons with less than 1 dollar a day  1481.8 1092.7
Percentage of population, with less than 2 dollars a day  66.8 52.9
Number of persons with less than 2 dollars a day  2449.8 2735.5
Sources: Szirmai (2007): www.dynamicsofdevelopment.com; GDP per capita from Maddison, 2007 
Diversity of country experiences 
One of the most striking phenomena in the study of development is the diversity of 
developing country experiences, especially since the oil shock of 1973. In Asia, several 
countries have experienced rapid growth and catch up, including Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Many Latin American economies grew rapidly until 1980, but their growth momentum has 
faltered since 1973 and their prospects are uncertain. With the exception of tiny countries 
such as Mauritius and Botswana and the exceptional case of South Africa, most African 
countries have experienced long-run stagnation since 1973, after a period of growth between 
1950 and 1973. In the Middle East, economic performance of most countries has been weak, 
in spite of vast oil resources. Few of the oil-rich countries have been able to use their mineral 
resources to generate sustainable growth in other sectors of the economy. As a result of these 
divergent trends, developing countries that had similar levels of per capita income in the 
1950s, such as e.g. Ghana and Thailand, now show vast differences in levels of economic 
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development (Lal and Myint, 1996). These divergent trends are illustrated in the following 
three figures. 
Figure 1:  
GDP per capita (1990 PPP$) in Asia and Africa, 
(South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Ghana, Tanzania), 
 1950-2006 
0
4.000
8.000
12.000
16.000
20.000
1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
South Korea Ghana Tanzania Malaysia thailand
So uth 
Ko rea
Ghana
M alaysia
T hailand
T anzania
 
Sources: 1950-1990, Maddison (2007); 1990-2006: GGDC, 2007 
 
Figure 2: 
GDP per Capita (1990 PPP$) in Oil Rich Countries 
Indonesia and Nigeria, 1950-2005 
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Sources: 1950-1990, Maddison (2007); 1990-2006: GGDC, 2007 
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Figure 3: 
GDP per capita (1990 PPP$) in Asia and Latin America 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 1950-2005 
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Sources: 1950-1990, Maddison (2007); 1990-2006: GGDC, 2007 
 
In this paper, I will explore what we can learn from these diverse experiences and the wealth 
of empirical studies about them.3 Can we come up with systematic explanations of relative 
success and failure in socio-economic development, or does it all remain a mystery or a 
matter of luck? To what extent can we assess future trends on the basis of past experiences?  
2 The Failure of Monocausal Explanations 
 
Explaining economic development is not for the simpleminded. The first observation that one 
can make is a negative one: every single mono-causal explanation ever advanced for 
development falls down in the face of the empirical evidence.  
 
Max Weber explained the breakthrough of capitalism in North Western Europe from the 
religious characteristics of the Protestantism. But, Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic cannot cope 
with the recent economic success of Confucian countries 
 
Differences in degrees of corruption cannot explain why some countries stagnate and others 
develop. Some countries and regions such as present-day China or Indonesia under Suharto 
prosper in spite of pervasive corruption, while others suffer deeply. Some types of corruption 
seem to be economically sustainable.  
 
Climatic and geographic determinists such as Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs et al. 2004) or Jared 
Diamond (1998) cannot account for the success of landlocked economies such as Switzerland, 
Austria, Botswana or rapid growth in tropical regions such as Malaysia, Thailand or Southern 
China.  
 
                                                 
3 The lecture is an attempt to summarise, synthesize and further develop the insights from my textbook The 
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development, CUP, 2005. The empirical data underlying the arguments are 
included in the book. Updates of these data are provided on the website: 
http://www.dynamicsofdevelopment.com 
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Japan, Korea and Taiwan have shown how countries can achieve phenomenal economic 
development with scarce natural resources. Coal, steel and oil are not essential for successful 
development. Oil and mineral resources have often – but again not always - even turned out to 
be a bane for economic development, as in the case of Nigeria, Congo or Venezuela, but less 
so in the case of Indonesia, Qatar or Botswana. 
 
Capital accumulation is an ingredient of every conceivable development strategy. But high 
rates of investment are no guarantee for sustained growth of per capita output or total factor 
productivity. If the capacity to absorb investment is lacking, mobilising national or 
international resources for investment results in waste and inefficiency. 
 
Human capital seems to be important in successful development experiences. But many 
African developing countries have achieved great success in expanding their education 
systems, while their economic growth stagnated (Pack and Paxson, 2001).  
 
Protection of property rights has often been advanced as a key precondition for innovation, 
technological change and economic progress (North and Thomas, 1973). But the case of 
China since 1978 illustrates that explosive growth and catch up can coexist with weak 
intellectual property rights and weakly defined property rights in general (Qian, 2003). To 
much emphasis on institutions, results in what Rodrik (2006) has called institutional 
fundamentalism. Either failures of reform can be explained away, because reform has never 
gone far enough, or the difficulty of achieving institutional reform becomes an excuse for 
inaction. 
 
Marxist and other theories of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation fail to explain why some 
former colonies break the mould of dependence and stagnation and emerge as dynamic 
economies, and others do not. Why did the USA become the world productivity leader while 
Brazil and Argentina have remained developing countries, though their decolonisation was 
only a few decades apart?  
 
Much has been made of good economic policies. It is certainly true that disastrous policies 
such as those of Zimbabwe’s Mugabe or Indonesia’s Sukarno can wreck a country. But apart 
from that policy variables such as openness to foreign investment, macroeconomic policies, 
price distortions, financial policies, and trade openness do not have predictable and robust 
effects on growth rates (Rodrik , 2006). 
 
The first insight that follows from this is that it is seldom single factors, which explain 
breakthroughs and successes in development. Rather, it is the interaction of many 
complementary internal and external factors and determinants and the timing of these 
interactions.  
 
Next, it would seem that older development economists such as Hirschman, Gerschenkron, 
Myrdal and Geertz are right. In his still eminently readable book Strategy of Economic 
Development (1958), Alfred Hirschman argues that one cannot compile a fixed list of 
‘prerequisites’ for economic development, which would automatically result in economic 
success. There may be functional alternatives for the so-called prerequisites, and the 
prerequisites may vary in time and space. In a similar vein, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
argued in Peddlers and Princes (1963) that almost any religion and culture has elements 
which under given circumstances can promote growth and in other circumstances can block it. 
Since Kemal Atatürk, Islam is often referred to as a cultural obstacle to economic 
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development, but Geertz documented the dynamic entrepreneurial attitudes amongst devout 
Indonesian Muslims as his prime example. Also, in present day Turkey, devout Muslims from 
Anatolia are a dynamic economic and entrepreneurial force in modern Turkey. In different 
ways, both Gerschenkron and Myrdal highlighted the importance of changing initial 
conditions, as a result of which processes of development are never the same as earlier 
processes. 
 
Rather than a fixed list of prerequisites or causal determinants, it sometimes appears that it is 
simply success that generates further success. Once dynamic processes of economic and 
technological change have been set in motion, these mobilise and call forth new talents and 
resources, which contribute to further development. Once growth is underway, economic 
success becomes path dependent and it seems as if new opportunities create further 
opportunities and policy makers can hardly do anything wrong, as in current China. The 
sources of growth in successful development experiences may differ, but whatever the 
sources, success feeds upon itself in what Myrdal (1968) referred to as cumulative causation. 
  
On the other hand, once development stagnates, as a result of external shocks, misguided 
policies, political instability or bad luck, it may be very difficult to get things moving again, 
as evidenced by Indonesia after the Asian crisis of 1997 and Sub-Saharan Africa after the 
1973 oil shock. Failure feeds on failure, just as much as success feeds on success. 
 
This notion of path dependence is further elaborated in modern evolutionary economics, 
which suggests that small initial differences are reinforced over time. Small initial changes set 
in motion cumulative process of growth and decline which cannot be predicted in advance, 
especially as the initial conditions for development are different in every region and historical 
period. 
 
The rather unsatisfactory corollary of this is that successful development might just be a 
matter of luck and that we cannot learn all that much from successful development 
experiences in the past. It is my conviction, however, that we should be able to do better than 
that on the basis of the empirical record. Though historical experiences are never repeated in 
unchanged form, though initial conditions differ and though development patterns are seldom 
identical, we can learn from a systematic empirical analysis of past experiences of growth and 
stagnation.  
3 Long-Run Divergence and Increasing Fluidity in the 
International Order 
 
The technology race in long-run perspective: divergence of levels of per capita income. 
Development needs to be studied in the context of a changing international economic and 
political order. One can conceive of the international economic order as an arena for a 
technology race, where countries and regions compete with each other over decades and 
centuries in terms of technology, productivity, GDP per capita and standards of living. In the 
long run these phenomena are closely linked. Technological advance fuels productivity 
growth. Growth of productive capacity provides the potential for growth of per capita 
incomes and improvements in standards of living, health, education and welfare.4  
                                                 
4  In this paper, I do not touch upon the increasingly pressing issues of global environmental sustainability. 
Given the immense problems of poverty, malnutrition and non-fulfilment of basic needs, setting the 
dynamics of growth and economic development in motion remains the most urgent priority for poor 
 10
 
In the World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (2001) and other publications, Angus 
Maddison has charted and quantified the long-run development of the world economic order. 
In Europe the acceleration of growth dates back to the fourteenth century, when Europe 
overtook the incumbent technological leader China.5 From the fourteenth century onwards, 
Europe experienced a long-run increase in per capita incomes, which also spread to the 
Western Offshoots. Since 1820, per capita incomes in the Western world have increased 20-
fold (Maddison, 2007, p. 70). As other regions and countries did not participate to the same 
extent in this growth process, global divergence increased.  
 
Among the unique characteristics of this long-run growth process are the dual nature of 
sustained internal growth and five hundred years of external economic and political expansion 
of the Western world. This resulted in the creation of a single interdependent world economic 
order, but not a global empire. The length of the Western growth experience contrasts with 
earlier cyclical economic movements of growth and decline.  
 
International interdependence reached a peak in the period 1870-1913 (whether measured by 
foreign investment, people flows, or trade flows). Global interdependencies were temporarily 
reduced in the autarkic period between the two world wars of the twentieth century. 
Globalisation picked up again after 1950, though it was only in the 1970s that globalisation 
reached levels similar to those of 1913.  
 
Post-war globalisation differs in at least two interesting respects from the earlier globalisation 
process. The first wave of globalisation coincided with the imperial expansion of the Western 
countries. The second wave of globalisation took place in the context of political 
decolonisation and western contraction, which started in the Middle East in the 1930s and was 
completed in 1989 when majority rule was achieved in South Africa. Next, the earlier global 
division of labour primarily expressed itself in flows of products, with developing countries 
exporting primary products to the advanced and advanced economies exporting manufactured 
goods to the developing world. The present globalisation trend involves deeper forms of 
functional integration. The international division of labour now revolves around the relocation 
of stages of the global value chain rather than on trade in final products (Dicken, 2003). 
Multinational corporations play a key role in managing global trade. 
 
Fluidity: long-run shifts in leadership 
The growth of the world economy and the evolution of the international order were 
accompanied by shifts in technological and economic leadership. Technological leadership 
shifted from China to Southern Europe in 14th century. Within Europe leadership shifted from 
Italian city states to the Iberian Peninsula, then in the 17th to North Western Europe, more 
specifically to the Dutch Republic. In the 18th century the, UK became the leader with 
breakthroughs in industrial production technologies. Around 1890, leadership shifted to the 
USA, which pioneered standardised production for mass markets and which has retained its 
lead in the post-1950 period.  
 
The productivity acceleration in the USA in the 1990s indicates that the USA shows no signs 
of losing its leadership in the short term. However, the Iraq war has shown the limits of US 
military dominance and persistent current account deficits and a declining confidence in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
developing countries. The advanced economies, which are responsible for the lions’ share of global pollution 
and global warming, should take the lead in making global growth ecologically more sustainable. 
5  Maddison dates the overtaking of China by Europe a century earlier than previous observers have done. 
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dollar may be the first signs of faltering leadership. Also, the twenty-first century is 
witnessing the emergence of the Asian Giants China and India, whose weight in the world 
economic order is rapidly increasing.  
 
The long-run shifts in leadership imply that in historical perspective there are no 
insurmountable gaps between leaders and followers. World hierarchies are not fixed. The 
international order has always been fluid and this fluidity is increasing.  
 
Fluidity: Catch up and relative stagnation 
The same is true from the perspective of follower countries. Since 1870 accelerated catch up 
processes took place in Germany, Russia (Gerschenkron, 1962) and Japan. Western European 
countries were catching up relative to the USA between 1950 and 1973. Japan’s catch up 
streak continued till 1990, followed by a long spell of sluggish growth and relative stagnation. 
Latin America grew rapidly from 1900 till 1980 (Hoffman, 1998; Maddison, 2001), catching 
up in some subperiods, though not all.  
 
In Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong provided spectacular examples of 
catch up from 1950 onwards. Since the 1980s, second-tier NICs such as Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka and Thailand have joined the race, while growth of output and productivity 
accelerated in the 1990s in China, India and Vietnam.  
 
Of course, it was not all catch up. As noted above, the catch-up process of Japan slowed down 
as Japan drew closer to the world frontier and had to make a painful shift from imitation to 
innovation.6 Productivity growth in the European economies and Japan lagged behind the 
accelerating productivity growth of the USA. After 1982, the shock of the debt crisis threw 
growth off-track in Latin America and triggered the lost decade of the 1980s and the 
subsequent economic instability. Latin America experienced relative stagnation since 1980, 
both relative to the world leaders and relative to emerging Asia. The countries of the former 
Soviet Union have experienced large contractions of their economies after 1989. Recovery 
has since set in in some of these countries including the Russian Federation, but not all of 
them. One of the most dramatic examples of long-run comparative decline was Argentina 
where the sustained populist policies of Peron destroyed the economic promise of the forties. 
The resurgence of populist policies in Latin America bodes ill for the economic future of the 
continent. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing stagnation since the oil crisis of 1973, but growth 
rates in several African countries have increased after 2000, fuelled by increasing demand for 
primary products. Some African countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Angola are now experiencing rapid growth.  
 
The paradox of increasing global inequality and accelerated catch up 
The modern international order is characterised by an interesting paradox of increasing 
inequality and increases in the speed of catch in selected countries. On the one hand, the 
technology race has resulted in a dramatic increase in long-run inequality in per capita 
incomes between countries. Around 1820, Maddison estimates that rich countries such as the 
UK had a per capita income of twice that of India. In 2006, the richest 29 countries are 14.2 
times as rich as the 48 poorest countries (at purchasing power parities) (WDI Database, 2008). 
                                                 
6  Fagerberg and Godinho (2006) argue that catch up involves more than merely imitating. It can also involve 
developing radical new ways of organization production and distribution.  
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In 2006, the ratio of the richest country in PPP terms, the USA to the poorest country, 
Burundi, was over 60 to 1.7 
 
The increase in global inequality demonstrates that is possible for some countries to 
experience sustained growth, escaping the shared poverty, characteristic of pre-modern 
agricultural economies. The concept of development itself is inextricably entwined with the 
long-run increase in global inequality between countries. If some Western countries had not 
forged ahead since the fourteenth century, the very notion of development as a long-run 
improvement in economic and social conditions would have been inconceivable. Catch up 
experiences show that development is also possible for countries that start at the bottom rungs 
of the global income and productivity ladder. 
 
On the other hand, as the steps on the global income ladder move further apart, the speed with 
which countries change their positions in the income ranking is also rapidly accelerating. 
Changes in the position of countries in the international technology race are not new. But, the 
high growth rates of China and earlier Japan, Taiwan and Korea in the twentieth century have 
not yet been witnessed in economic history. In one or two generations, such countries move 
from the very lowest positions to the middle or even the upper ranges of the income ladder. 
 
Thus, the experiences since 1950 indicate that increasing global inequality does not result in 
an insurmountable divide between rich and poor countries. Rather, the global income 
distribution becomes increasingly fluid.8 The boundaries between richer and poorer countries 
are continuously shifting. Formerly rich countries such as Argentine or the Russian Federation 
show relative decline. Formerly poor countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Taiwan and Korea 
move upwards. It is worth emphasizing that many of the catch-up countries are countries with 
large populations (India, China, Indonesia or Vietnam).9  
 
The Asian miracle is not a miracle 
Most of the catch up since 1950 took place in Asia. The literature abounds with references to 
the Asian Miracle or the Chinese Miracle. This is a misnomer. Very high growth rates are the 
normal pattern in a catch up process, where technological backward countries can profit from 
international available technological knowledge without bearing the costs and risks of 
developing new knowledge. If catch up takes place, it is usually happens very rapidly. If not, 
then a country will continue to fall behind. Table 2 provides evidence of the high rates of 
growth which are characteristic of catch up economies in the period since 1950. 
 
                                                 
7  The exact ratio depends on how one defines the set of poorest and richest countries. It also depends on 
whether or not one has a balanced panel with the same countries defined as poor and rich at the beginning 
and the end of the period. Nevertheless, the long-run trends of increasing inequality are unmistakable. 
8  An interesting characteristic of the international order after 1973 is that growth trends in the developing 
world have become divergent, with catch up in some regions and relative and absolute stagnation in others. 
This is a clear contrast with the period 1950-73. 
9  This aspect of the international order is missed in the twin peak studies of Danny Quah (1997), which assign 
equal weight to all countries irrespective of their size and suggest insurmountable gaps between rich and poor 
countries. 
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Table 2: Post-War Catch Up Episodes 
Country Period 
Growth 
of GDP 
Growth of 
GDP/capita 
China 1978-2006 8,1 6,9 
West Germany 1950-1973 6,0 5,0 
India 1994-2006 6,7 5,1 
Indonesia 1967-1997 6,8 4,8 
Ireland 1995-2006 6,2 6,2 
Japan 1946-1973 9,3 8,0 
Korea 1952-1997 8,2 6,3 
Malaysia 1968-1997 7,5 5,1 
Russia 1998-2005 7,2 7,2 
Singapore 1960-1973 10,0 7,6 
Taiwan 1962-1973 11,4 8,7 
Thailand 1973-1996 7,6 5,8 
Vietnam 1992-2005 7,6 6,1 
    
World  1950-1973 4,9 2,9 
World  1973-1997 3,1 1,4 
World  1997-2003 3,5 2,3 
Sources: Country data 1990 and before, plus figures for world total from  
Angus Maddison, Historical Statistics, World Population, GDP and Per 
Capita GDP, 1-2003 AD (Last update: August 2007) 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
Country data 1991-2006 and West Germany from:  
The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
Total Economy Database, November 2007, http://www.conference-
board.org/economics" .West Germany from Conference Board/GGDC 
 
Note: The periods have been chosen so as to maximise sustained high 
growth rates over an extended period 
4 Proximate, Intermediate and Ultimate Sources of Growth  
 
The framework 
For the analysis of success and failure in long-run economic development, the framework of 
proximate and ultimate sources of growth developed by among others Angus Maddison 
(1988) is very useful.10 Here, I provide some further elaboration of this framework, 
distinguishing proximate, intervening and ultimate sources. 
 
The proximate sources of growth suggest ways in which countries can try to improve their 
position in the international technology and productivity race. The proximate sources refer to 
the directly measurable sources of growth of output such as capital accumulation, embodied 
technological change, growth of labour input and human capital, exploitation of natural 
resources and the increasing efficiency with which resources are used to produce a flow of 
goods and services. The efficiency term subsumes a wide range of economic aspects such as 
economies of scale, utilisation rates, technical efficiency of production, efficient choice of 
techniques, efficient specialisation in products and sectors, comparative advantage and 
changes in disembodied knowledge and absorptive capacities. In terms of growth of output 
per capita, the growth equation can be expressed in terms of capital intensity, human capital 
intensity, resource intensity and total factor productivity.  
 
                                                 
10 Recently, a somewhat similar framework has also been put forward by Rodrik (2003), though without 
reference to the earlier work in this field. 
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It is long known (Abramovitz, 1989; Nelson, 1996; Rodrik, 2003) that one should be very 
careful in giving the sources of growth equation a strong structural interpretation. As Rodrik 
notes for instance, capital accumulation and efficiency of the use of resources are themselves 
endogenous. “.... observing that 80 per cent of growth is "accounted” for by accumulation, 
does not tell us that growth would have necessarily been 80 per cent as high in the absence of 
technological change; perhaps in the absence of productivity change, the incentive to 
accumulate would have been much lower and the resulting capital deepening significantly 
less….. the causality may well run backwards, from growth to accumulation and 
productivity….”(Rodrik, 2003, p. 4). So we should think of accumulation and productivity as 
proximate determinants of growth at best. Nevertheless, the sources of growth equation sets 
the stage for what we want to explain and analyse. 
 
Proximate sources of growth include the following 
• Saving and Capital accumulation. Being sober and abstaining from current consumption in 
order to save and invest results in capital accumulation. Output per person engaged is increased 
by supplying workers with implements, machines and capital goods. The amount of capital per 
worker - capital intensity - increases. Not only does the amount of capital increase, but also its 
quality. Capital accumulation goes hand in had with capital embodied technological change. 
Capital accumulation can be more easily realised in spatially concentrated manufacturing than 
in spatially dispersed agriculture. This is one of the reasons why the emergence of 
manufacturing has been so important in growth and development.  
 
• Increased scale of production. Large-scale production of standardised products is usually more 
productive than small-scale production. As in the case of capital accumulation, scale 
economies are more easily realised in manufacturing than in agriculture. Recently, in the 
context of more flexible production systems, economies of scope have received more 
emphasis. But, economies of scope also assume production on a very large scale for very large 
markets. 
 
• Increased effort. Output per person is increased by increasing the labour input per person. This 
can take a variety of forms, including higher labour market participation and longer hours 
worked. Also of importance is the discipline and intensity of effort of members of the work 
force. This is why investments in health can affect the quality and intensity of labour input. 
Health status influences the physical and mental energy available for various kinds of work. 
Intensity of effort also links up with culturally defined attitudes, incentives and motivations 
with regard to work. 
 
• Accumulation of human capital. Human capital theory suggests that schooling and education 
makes workers more productive. Accumulation of human capital may take place through 
formal schooling, but also through on-the-job training, learning by doing and by using new 
technologies. If the education system is adequate it transfers the latest state of knowledge to its 
students. This means that accumulation of human capital represents labour embodied 
technological change.  
 
• Exploration and exploitation of natural resources. This involves investment in land 
preparation for agricultural use and investment in the exploration and exploitation of energy 
resources and mineral raw materials. Exploitation of mineral resources can promote growth, 
but such growth will not be economically sustainable unless the revenues from windfall 
discoveries are transformed into more durable sources of growth in other sectors of the 
economy. 
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• Theft. Appropriating resources from other societies and using these to accumulate capital. 
Theft and colonial plunder can be an important source of capital accumulation. However, if 
resources are appropriated but not reinvested, they will have the same non-sustainable effects 
as windfall discoveries of natural resources. In the dominated society, the effect of 
appropriation is to reduce the investable surplus, thus contributing to economic stagnation. 
 
• Increased efficiency. Increased efficiency covers a wide range of factors such as higher 
capacity utilisation, more effective use of existing technologies (technical efficiency), 
appropriate combinations of labour and capital and other inputs (choice of technique, 
economic efficiency) and international specialisation according to comparative advantage. 
Structural change is also an important aspect of increased efficiency. Structural change 
involves shifting resources from sectors with lower productivity, lack of dynamism and weak 
linkages (such as traditional agriculture) to sectors with higher productivity, greater dynamism 
and stronger linkages (such as manufacturing). One can distinguish microeconomic efficiency, 
which involves producing more output with given inputs or allocative efficiency through better 
allocation of resources across the economy (specialisation, comparative advantage and 
structural change).  
 
• Changes in the organisation of production. This aspect of efficiency improvement (X-
efficiency) deserves separate attention. It involves aspects such as the division of labour, 
flexible production systems, systems of motivation, monitoring systems and changes in the 
logistic organisation of production. 
 
• Technological change proper (disembodied technological change). Disembodied 
technological change refers to advances in our technological knowledge concerning products 
and production processes. It involves the development of new production processes, new types 
of machinery, new forms of organisation, use of new inputs, new products and services, new 
ways of distributing products and services, and new knowledge that can be transferred through 
education. 
 
We can identify the following – partly overlapping - aspects of disembodied technological 
change: a. changes in a stock of knowledge available to the firm, the sector or the country; b. 
improvements in the knowledge absorbed by employees and managers in school and on the 
job through learning by doing. (Maddison, 1987, p. 662); c. improvements in technological 
capabilities of firms and social capabilities of countries d. the positive external effects of 
knowledge spillovers within an economy or between economies. 
 
With regard to technological change we need to distinguish between technological change at 
the frontiers of knowledge in the lead economies and diffusion and absorption of technology 
in the follower countries. 
 
• Complementarities of human skills and human capital and increases and improvements in the 
capital stock. Abramovitz has emphasized the importance of complementarities between 
the proximate sources of growth. Among the most important of these complementarities is 
that between capital goods embodying new technologies and improvements in skills and 
human capital. Without appropriate inflows of new capital, new skills will be wasted 
(Pack and Paxson, 2001) and vice versa. Thus, the joint effect of accumulation of human 
capital, and physical capital may be much larger than the sum of the separate 
contributions. 
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What complicates the issue, however, is that complementarity does not necessarily mean 
simultaneity. There are indications that prior investments in human capital set the stage for 
subsequent effective deployment of physical capital (Godo and Hayami, 2002; Sandberg, 
1982). The time lags involved can be substantial, up to 40-60 years. 
 
Intermediate sources of growth refer to two types of factors: 1. trends in domestic and 
international demand and 2. policies: economic policies, social policies and technology 
policies. The intermediate sources of growth are important for the understanding of path-
dependent nature of processes of success and failure. Thus when world demand and domestic 
demand are growing and market shares are expanding, this will help mobilise the 
accumulation of human and physical capital, which results in further growth and 
competitiveness. 
 
Interpreting socio-economic policy as an intermediate factor emphasizes that policy is in turn 
influenced and constrained by more ultimate factors such as interests and class relationships. 
This is increasingly being rediscovered in recent research in political economy (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Shleifer, 1993, Shleifer et al. 2004), 
which see policy itself as an endogenous variable, explained by more ultimate factors as the 
balance of power and interests within societies. 
 
Note that even within the proximate sources, there is circularity, as total factor productivity 
growth and technological change provide incentives for human and physical capital 
accumulation.  
 
The ultimate sources of growth refer to historical trends, external shocks, demographic 
changes, institutions, attitudes and culture and the geographic, social and political conditions 
within which the proximate and intermediate factors operate. The ultimate sources include: a). 
geographic location, climate and natural resources; b). demographic and epidemiological 
trends; c). the history of political centralisation and state formation; d). the dynamics of class 
relationships, political conflict; e). the evolution of values and attitudes which affect 
economic behaviour; f). the development of institutions such as private property, intellectual 
property rights, joint stock companies, banking institutions, institutions for conflict 
management and maintenance of law and order, institutions which align economic incentives 
with social costs and benefits; g). developments in the international order, such as the 
international trade regime; h). long-run developments in science and technology; i). the 
distance of a country to the technological frontier, which determines its catch up potential; j). 
absorptive capacity and the evolution of technological and social capabilities. 
 
In a recent version of the framework of proximate and ultimate sources of growth, Dani 
Rodrik (2003) emphasizes three key factors: geography (resources and location), institutions 
and openness to trade. Of these three, he argues that geography is the most ultimate. It 
influences the proximate resource endowment of a country, as well as its opportunities for 
trade through its location. Openness to trade and institutions are seen as more intermediate 
sources, with institutions and institutional quality providing the key to the explanation for 
development.  
 
The use of the term ultimate sources of growth is not meant to imply a linear model of 
causality. Causality is circular, with economic growth obviously affecting demographic and 
epidemiological transitions in well-known ways. In the long run even cultural values and 
institutions are shaped and reshaped in the course of economic development (Harrison, 1985; 
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Harrison and Huntington, 2000).11 The difference between the more ultimate and more 
proximate sources of causality lies mainly in the ease of quantification and the time span of 
the chains of causality. It also provides a research strategy, which starts with the measurable 
economic factors and then goes beyond that to broader social and historical determinants. It 
also provides a framework for multidisciplinary analysis of economic development. 
 
Initiating Growth and Maintaining Growth 
In the context of a discussion of policy reform, Rodrik (2006) has made a very interesting and 
important distinction between initiating growth and maintaining growth. The factors that 
initiate growth may not be the same as those important for maintaining growth. In order to 
initiate growth, one needs to identify the binding constraints facing a specific country. These 
will differ from country to country, so that policies which are successful in one setting may 
completely backfire in another. There are no standard recipes for kick-starting growth. This 
explains why so many of the cross-country regressions with policy or institutional variables 
give inconclusive results. 
 
Once growth is underway, the question is how to maintain it in the longer run. Here gradual 
institutional improvements, which may not have been a binding constraint for starting growth, 
become more important. One might say that growth buys time for deeper institutional 
reforms. In absence of such reforms, an economy for instance remains vulnerable to external 
shocks, which may put a country off an accelerating growth path and put it on a stagnating 
trajectory. Examples of such external shocks are major wars such as World War I and II, 
financial crises such as the Asian crisis of 1997 or the debt crisis of 1982.  
 
External shocks can also have positive economic effects, such as the cataclysmic communist 
revolution in China or land reform in post-conflict Korea and Taiwan. It can have deep 
negative effects such as the impact of the debt crisis of 1982 on Latin American development, 
or of the Asian crisis on Indonesian economic development. Sometimes the same shock has 
very different effects on different countries. Most Asian economies recovered quickly from 
the Asian crisis, but Indonesia needed 10 years to regain to its pre-crisis levels of GDP per 
capita. Shocks interact with the strength and effectiveness of domestic institutional 
arrangements. Strong shocks combined with weak institutions and policies may have 
disastrous effects and put an economy on a downward growth trajectory. 
 
Of course, there can be no long-run success without success in initiating growth in the short 
run. But the explanations of long-term growth and development are different from those of 
success in initiating growth. In this paper, I focus on the long-run patterns of growth and 
development.  
5 Theories of growth 
Classical theorists such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill focus on ultimate factors such as 
the emergence and functions of market institutions. Karl Marx emphasized the dynamics of 
market competition, technological change and class relationships in the capitalist system. Max 
Weber focused on importance of political centralisation and stability and the religious 
underpinnings of the work and savings ethic. Schumpeter wrote eloquently about the 
emergence of entrepreneurship as the source of creative destruction and economic growth and 
on different types of market competition and their impact on innovation. In his later work he 
                                                 
11 Ester Boserup has argued that even the seemingly ultimate factor of ‘natural’ environment has been shaped by 
the impact of human interventions in socio-economic development. 
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worried about the social forces such as bureaucratisation of research which were undermining 
entrepreneurship. Dependency theorists explain the underdevelopment of developing 
countries through the institutional characteristics of an exploitative international economic 
order. 
 
Post-war neo-classical growth theories focus much more on proximate factors such as 
education, capital accumulation or comparative advantage. Until recently, mainstream 
economic theories have tended to disregard ultimate factors such as the evolution of markets, 
institutions, class relations and technological change. These were dismissed as exogenous and 
are relegated to despised disciplines such as history, sociology or anthropology. Only recently 
have mainstream economists rediscovered institutions (e.g. Easterly, 2001; Rodrik, 2003; 
Acemoglu, 2005). 
 
Theories of growth are radically different in their predictions about the chances of catch up in 
developing countries. Neo-classical theories of growth predict convergence between rich and 
poor countries, as the returns to capital are higher in poor countries where capital is scarce. 
This prediction runs counter to the empirical evidence which suggests long-run divergence. 
Theories of conditional convergence present a modified version of the neo-classical argument, 
which suggests that within groups of countries with similar initial conditions levels of GDP 
per capita tend to converge. However, the steady-state growth rates of the different growth 
clubs may differ so that divergence between convergence clubs may or may not result in 
global divergence. The problem with this strand of theory is that it does not explain why 
different clubs of countries converge of diverge. Endogenous growth theory, a modern 
version of neo-classical theory predicts systematic divergence between leaders and followers, 
because firms in the lead economies benefit from technology spillovers resulting in constant 
or even increasing returns to investments in capital, education and technology. Thus rich 
countries will forge ahead and poor countries with less domestic spillovers will fall behind. A 
weakness of new growth theory is that it cannot easily cope with the evidence on catch up in 
selected developing countries. 
 
Theories of the advantages of backwardness. Authors such as Veblen, Gerschenkron, 
Abramovitz and Maddison have argued forcefully that there are great potential advantages to 
technological backwardness. Technologically backward countries can profit from 
international technology transfers or spillovers, without bearing the costs and risks of 
investment in innovation at the knowledge frontier. If their absorptive capacities are 
sufficiently developed, they can experience explosive growth spurts through rapid 
incorporation and adaptation of modern international technology.  
 
Growth is explosive for a variety of reasons. First, there are sudden jumps in technological 
levels. There is an element of leapfrogging from vastly outdated to state-of-the-art 
technologies, such as digital switching or mobile phone systems. Second, the capital-intensive 
nature of modern technology tends to make growth a scale intensive process, with an all-or-
nothing character (Gerschenkron, 1962). If growth takes place in a technologically backward 
economy, it will tend to be more rapid than in previous historical growth episodes. 
 
This theory is very relevant for our understanding of the post-war catch experiences in Asia. 
Also, Gerschenkron has alerted us to the fact that the conditions and policies underlying 
growth spurts change over time, given the nature of technology and developments in the 
international order. This opens up growth theory to historical inquiry. 
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What remains problematic is how to explain why in a given setting the lead countries 
sometimes forge ahead leaving followers behind, such as the USA versus Europe and Japan in 
the nineties, while in other settings the lead countries are overtaken by the newcomers. We 
encountered a similar problem when discussing conditional convergence. A second question 
is why some countries profit from the advantages of backwardness in a given period, while 
other countries fail to do so and fall behind even further. But here, catch up theory does give 
some promising answers by pointing to the importance of the absorptive capacities of 
follower countries.  
  
Evolutionary theories of growth (in the tradition of Schumpeter and later Nelson and Winter, 
1982; see also Dosi et al., 1988; Freeman and Soete, 1997, Verspagen, 1993; Verspagen, 
2001; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). Evolutionary theory combines ideas about advantages 
of backwardness and technology gaps with notions similar to those of new growth theorists 
about spillovers in the lead economies.12 Evolutionary theory postulates a race between 
technological change and domestic spillovers in the lead countries resulting in divergence and 
international diffusion of technology to follower countries resulting in catch up. The balance 
of these two forces is not deterministically given. It depends on the size of the technology gap 
– when the gap is larger than some threshold level, the disadvantages of backwardness 
outweigh the potential advantages. It also depends on differences in absorptive capacities 
between developing countries. Finally, like theories of backwardness, evolutionary theory 
allows for changes in historical circumstances and the emergence of new technological 
‘paradigms’ (Freeman and Perez, 1988), which may reshuffle the technological playing field 
and create new opportunities for backward countries and new penalties of leadership for the 
lead countries. Thus acceleration of technical change in information technologies created new 
and previously unconceivable opportunities for catch up through growth in ICT services in 
countries such as India. It also created new opportunities for manufacturing outsourcing to 
developing countries, through global value chains, which have had profound impacts on the 
global division of labour.  
 
Importance of technological change in modern growth theories 
Investment in technological change is central to present-day theories of growth and catch up 
of all stripes, whether new growth theory, theories of backwardness or evolutionary theories. 
In the deepest sense, growth and catch up has to do with the generation and diffusion of new 
knowledge and technology. Technological change is entwined with all other factors in the 
growth equation (capital, education, efficiency, disembodied technological change, structural 
change), but also plays an independent role as disembodied knowledge or technology. In his 
wide-ranging analysis of the sources of economic growth, Abramovitz (1989) concluded that 
underlying the separate sources identified in growth analysis, is a common process of 
technological change, which manifests itself in a variety of ways.  
 
Knowledge is produced through human effort, and requires investment. But investment in 
new technology or new knowledge is fundamentally different from investment in physical 
capital. It is non-rival (use of knowledge by one person does not mean that another person 
cannot use it) and non-excludable (Verspagen, 2001). It is harder to exploit commercially than 
physical capital goods. The characteristic of knowledge is that it flows, diffuses and spills 
                                                 
12  Evolutionary theory rejects some of the key notions of new neoclassical growth theory such as equilibrium, 
common production functions and the representative actor. Rather it focuses on varieties of actors following 
different rules of thumb. The impact of a selection environment on success and failure of economic actors 
creates path dependent trajectories. Nevertheless, in there are similarities in the endogenisation of 
technological change (see Verspagen, 2001). 
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from firm to firm, individual to individual, country to country. Unless means can be devised 
to control the unrestricted flow of knowledge and appropriate part of the revenues accruing to 
new knowledge, there will be insufficient incentives for sustained and costly investment in 
new knowledge.13 Thus, restricting or controlling the free flow of technological knowledge is 
one of the profound sources of growth and development, as it provides an incentive for the 
production of new knowledge and technology.  
 
On the other hand the rapid diffusion of knowledge is just as important as a source of growth. 
Investment in knowledge has widespread positive external effects. Firms profit from the 
advances of knowledge produced by their competitors, and thus growth in knowledge 
producing countries will accelerate due to these spillovers. The better the absorptive 
capacities of firms, the less restrictions there are to the spread of technology. The more 
efficient the national system of innovation (Lundvall, 1992), the more rapid growth will be. 
The countries that profit most from these spillovers will be the leaders in the technology race. 
 
Diffusion of knowledge and knowledge spillovers are not only important within national 
economies, they also take place in an international context. It is the international diffusion of 
knowledge which has contributed to spectacular catch up in a limited number of developing 
countries since 1950, as emphasized by theories of backwardness. The more the free flow of 
knowledge is restricted through policy measures or institutional obstacles, the less 
opportunities there are for catch up based on the advantages of backwardness. Developing 
countries that acquire, steal, copy and absorb knowledge effectively will be the candidates for 
catch up. 
 
Thus, diffusion of technological knowledge works in two opposite directions. On the one 
hand it is the main force making for global divergence in modern theories of growth. The lead 
countries tend to have the strongest systems of innovation. They will profit most from the 
advances in knowledge generated by their firms, R&D labs and inventors. On the other hand, 
international diffusion of knowledge explains very rapid catch up. In the international context 
of technological leaders and followers, the Gerschenkron/Abramovitz catch up effect can also 
be seen as a manifestation of international knowledge flows. The greater the gap between 
leaders and followers, the greater the potential for growth due to knowledge flows. This 
notion has become generally accepted in growth accounting and growth analysis, but it is not 
always explicitly linked to the newer concept of spillovers. In any event, a technology gap 
term is now standard in growth equations. It clearly refers to an important aspect of 
disembodied technological change.  
 
Though knowledge seems to flow easily, it is nevertheless very difficult to absorb. Some 
firms are able to absorb knowledge, others fail to do so. At a macro-level, differences in 
absorptive capacities are important in explaining which developing countries embark on a 
catch up path and which countries fall behind. This is reflected a number of different 
literatures, which are not always cognisant of each other. These include the literatures on 
technological capabilities which focuses on absorptive capacities of firms in developing 
countries, the macro-literature on social capabilities based on Abramovitz which focuses on 
the absorptive capacities of countries and the literature on systems of innovation pioneered by 
                                                 
13 The importance of patents as a means of appropriation is contested (Nuvolari, 2004). There are those who 
argue that other methods of appropriation such as secrecy or first mover advantages are more important. Even 
more important is the notion of open source innovation where sharing common knowledge is the main incentive. 
It is an interesting debate, but I think the importance of these idealistic alternatives is overrated.  
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Lundvall (1992), which can be used to explain flows of knowledge both within countries and 
between countries. 
6 Patterns and Explanations 
 
In the following sections I apply the framework of proximate and ultimate causes to identify 
common elements and patterns in successful episodes of economic development. 
6.1 Proximate sources 
 
• Capital accumulation 
Without exception successful development involves bridging the capital intensity gap and 
increasing domestic savings and/or foreign inflows of capital. Without rapid accumulation of 
capital, there can be no success in economic development. Capital accumulation and capital 
intensification are closely linked with industrialisation.  
 
Developing countries have been remarkably effective in increasing their investment rates 
since 1950. Saving rates in developing countries are now comparable to or higher than those 
in the advanced economies. China, in particular, has extremely high savings rates. But, neither 
the rate of capital accumulation nor the level of capital per worker is a guarantee for a high 
rate of economic growth. If the efficiency of investment is low and absorptive capacity (skills, 
education, capability, experience, incentives) is lacking, capital productivity and total factor 
productivity will be low and the impact of accumulation on growth will be limited. Thus, the 
very substantial increases in investment rates in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-war period are 
not mirrored by comparable increases in the rates of economic growth.  
 
• Net inflow of resources and accumulation 
In contrast to the pre-war period in which many colonies experienced a net outflow of 
resources, the post-war period is characterised by a net inflow of financial resources to 
developing countries (Maddison, 1986; Szirmai, 2005). This inflow consists of loans, foreign 
direct investment, private transfers, aid flows and debt relief. The inflows were briefly 
interrupted in the late 1980s in the aftermath of the debt crisis of 1982 and in the late 1990s 
after the Asian crisis. But, after a few years the pattern of inflows reasserted itself. 
Developing countries have typically imported more than they exported. They have imported 
both capital goods and consumer goods. On balance, the inflows of capital have contributed to 
higher savings rates and higher rates of capital accumulation.  
 
• Human capital accumulation 
In all cases of successful development, investment in human capital, expansion of educational 
enrolment and increased literacy have been important, in one way or another. The argument 
of Gerschenkron (1962) that education can be replaced by technologies which economise on 
skilled labour is not supported by the historical record of catch up countries.  
 
The expansion of education and human capital has been one of the greatest success stories of 
the post-war period (see Szirmai, 2005, tables 7.1-7.6). In many cases starting from scratch, 
developing countries have built comprehensive education systems which cover large 
segments of their populations. Though there are major problems with educational quality and 
the mismatch between education and the labour market and though universal primary 
education has not yet been realised in all countries, progress in human capital accumulation is 
unmistakable. Rates of illiteracy are decreasing and human capital per worker is increasing. 
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The effects of education on economic development are, however, very complex. Some 
theorists have emphasized that expansion of education and literacy precedes acceleration of 
economic development by many decades. This was the case in the Scandinavian countries, 
Japan, China, Taiwan and Korea (Sandberg, 1982; Nuñez, 1990; Godo and Hayami, 2002). 
So, expansion of education may not have immediate and direct consequences for growth, as is 
confirmed by the experiences of many developing countries. In an excellent analysis of the 
Japanese catch-up experience, Godo and Hayami (2002) combine the notions of 
complementarity and threshold. The early increase in education initially had little impact on 
growth, because capital per worker was growing slowly, so there was little complementarity. 
After World War II, a threshold level of education had been reached and capital accumulation 
and slower education advance combined to promote explosive growth.  
 
Where educational investment was insufficient, this has generally acted as a brake on 
development. Thus, expansion and improvement of education in one form or another may be 
considered one of the important necessary conditions for development. 
 
 The concept of human capital is broader than education. It includes health and sufficient 
nutrition, which also contribute to productivity of households and growth of economies.  
 
• Structural Change: Industrialisation as an engine of growth 
Since 1950, all developing countries that have experienced rapid growth and catch up, have 
been successful industrialisers and industrial exporters (e.g. van Ark and Timmer, 2003). 
Countries that fell behind in aggregate terms were also the weakest industrial performers. In 
the past fifty years, manufacturing has been the main engine of growth and development in 
developing countries. In other words, the structural change involved in the shift from 
agriculture to industry has been a key ingredient of successful economic development. 
 
The pattern of structural change in post-war developing countries differed from the earlier 
pattern in the advanced economies, where the share of industry increased first and the share of 
services increased later. In developing countries, there was a simultaneous shift from 
agriculture to industry and services. At an early stage, the share of services was already as 
high as or higher than that of industry. This has to do with the rapid expansion of the 
government share in GDP. It is likely that this early growth of a not very productive service 
sector acted as a brake on development.  
 
Though the share of manufacturing in GDP and employment has increased in a great majority 
of developing countries, the increasing share of developing countries in world exports of 
manufacturing goods is attributable to some 12-15 countries (including China, India, Brazil, 
Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Singapore and Hong 
Kong).  
 
• The Learning curve for industrialisation 
According to Arthur Lewis learning to industrialise is a lengthy process which can take up to 
30- 40 years (Lewis, 1978). Both the evolution of industrial entrepreneurship and the 
submission to the discipline of factory production for a work force being transferred from 
agriculture are difficult processes which take considerable time. It is worth noting that all the 
developing countries which were successful in industrialising after 1950, had learning 
experiences in industrialisation which date back to the 1930s and sometimes even to the 
nineteenth century, as in the case of China and India. The failed industrialisation of sub-
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Saharan Africa since 1950 is not due to some innate incapacity for industrial production. It is 
in part due to the fact that industrialisation really started from almost nothing in the post-war 
period. This means that future prospects for industrialisation in African countries may be 
brighter than before.  
 
• Agricultural Development: Decreasing shares, increasing output and productivity 
In contrast to the predictions of Malthusian pessimists, developing countries have been 
remarkably successful in increasing the per capita output of foodstuffs in the post-war period. 
The increases have been most striking in large and densely populated developing countries 
such as India, Indonesia and China (Szirmai, 2005, table 10.1). The exception to this trend is 
sub-Saharan Africa where output per capita is at the same level as that in 1979-81 and lower 
than in 1934. 
 
These output and productivity increases have been realised through expansion of arable land, 
increases in cropping intensities, increases in irrigation, increases in the application of 
fertilizers and development and diffusion of new seeds (biotechnological change). Increases 
in yields per harvest (irrigation, fertilizers and technological change) account for over 70 per 
cent of output growth in the past 40 years (Szirmai, 2005, table 10.8).  
 
These increases in agricultural output have been realised with shrinking shares of agricultural 
in total employment and shrinking shares of agriculture in GDP. Nevertheless, there is a 
correlation between successful development in agriculture and overall economic performance 
in developing countries. 
 
• Total factor productivity growth and technological change 
In the context of East Asian industrialisation, there is a well-known debate between 
accumulationists emphasizing the role of capital accumulation and assimilationists 
emphasizing the role of technological change (see Timmer, 2000). Accumulationists argue 
that physical capital accumulation has been more important than total factor productivity 
growth. Their pessimistic prediction was that the growth process would run out of steam once 
sufficient capital had been accumulated. This has so far not occurred in South and East Asia. 
 
There is, however, a measure of truth in the accumulationist observation that in early phases 
of industrial development, wasteful processes of accumulation predominate, whether in 
Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Nehru’s India or Nyerere’s Tanzania. Industrialisation in 
Korea and Taiwan also started with capital accumulation in combination with cheap unskilled 
labour in textiles and assembly activities. This ‘primitive’ accumulation usually goes hand in 
hand with highly distorted markets, extensive government intervention, nationalisations, 
protection, large scale production and import substitution (Lin et al., 2000).  
 
The key question is whether, after accumulation processes have been set into motion, an 
economy can upgrade its production technology, achieve shifts from low-tech sectors to 
medium and high tech sectors, and increase its overall efficiency. All these elements will 
express themselves in growth of total factor productivity. One of the typical differences 
between success and failure in economic development lies in the realisation of this switch 
from accumulation to upgrading. The development experiences of both the newer and the 
older Asian industrialising countries demonstrate that the accumulationists have been too 
pessimistic and that such shifts are possible.  
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On average, TFP growth rates since the 1990s have been higher than in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Growth has accelerated, human capital has been upgraded, new sectors have emerged and 
new technologies have been absorbed.  
 
The assimilationists are also right in emphasizing that even the raw accumulation of physical 
capital requires a major effort of mastering, adapting and implementing imported embodied 
technologies. Thus, TFP change in developing countries is closely associated with the 
international transfer and acquisition of technology.  
6.2 Intermediate sources 
• Prudent macroeconomic policies 
It is now becoming customary in academic circles to routinely sneer at the Washington 
consensus (Williamson, 1990) underlying the neo-liberal policy recommendations for 
developing countries since the 1990s. However, there is strong evidence that macroeconomic 
stability and prudent fiscal and monetary policies have been essential ingredients in the Asian 
growth performance and successful growth episodes elsewhere. 
 
It is the inability of Latin American countries to implement sustained macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies over longer periods of time, which underpins the disappointing 
performance of Latin American policies since the oil shock of 1973. In Latin America, bursts 
of painful macroeconomic restructuring adjustment have been followed time and time again 
by populist waves of resistance against adjustment policies. Thus, it seems as if Latin 
America is primarily experiencing the negative side of economic orthodoxy: painful 
restructuring without long-term benefits following from sustained adjustment policies. This 
inability to realise sustained macroeconomic stability may well have to do with high degrees 
of initial inequality in Latin America which creates political stresses and pressures that affect 
the economic policy stance.14 The present re-emergence of Peronist-type policies and populist 
political movements in Venezuela and Bolivia bodes ill for their economic future in the longer 
run. 
 
However, orthodox macroeconomic policies are in themselves not sufficient to attain high 
growth rates and increased economic welfare. These also requires microeconomic changes 
and supporting industrial and technology policies which allow for a transition from capital 
accumulation to technological upgrading.  
 
• Policies aimed at achieving a balance between agricultural and industrial development  
Finding a good policy balance between incentives for agriculture and industry is an ingredient 
of successful development. Balanced growth path theory emphasizes that growth is enhanced 
if the different sectors grow at such rates that they do not act as a brake on growth in other 
sectors. This is especially relevant for the agricultural sector. As the agricultural sector 
provides food to the urban population, intermediate inputs to manufacturing and a market for 
industrial products, policy discrimination against agriculture has a negative impact on 
industrial growth and development success. Between 1945 and 1960, development policies 
discriminated heavily against agriculture, with markedly negative results. Countries in sub-
Saharan Africa which had long been self-sufficient in food production, became more and 
more dependent on agricultural imports and food aid. Negative climatic conditions and 
                                                 
14 This is an example of the intermediate character of economic policy, which in turn is influenced by more 
ultimate conditions in a country. 
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droughts account for some of this impact, but man-made policies were at least as important in 
explaining agricultural stagnation. 
 
In parts of the developing world, intersectoral policies started changing from 1960 onwards. 
Especially, India, China, Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia started taking a more balanced 
approach (Timmer, 2005). The policy bias against agriculture continued longest in sub-
Saharan Africa, up till around 1980 or later. It is only since the 1990s that changes have 
started being implemented here in the context of structural adjustment programmes. These 
changes refer to the gradual elimination of price controls, marketing boards and similar 
exploitative institutions that discriminate against agriculture.  
 
• Trade regime : Outward economic orientation 
The developing countries that are economically most successful, are invariably those that 
opened up to the outside world and engaged in international trade. (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 
1995; Rodrik, 2003). Those countries that remained inward-oriented for too long, were the 
countries that stagnated. The degree of export-orientedness is one of the key elements 
distinguishing Southeast Asia from Latin America. Latin America continued inward-looking 
policies much longer than the East Asian economies. The outward orientation of the East 
Asian economies contributed to an appropriate choice of techniques, where economies made 
optimal use of their supply of cheap labour to become competitive on world markets. 
 
• Openness to foreign investment 
Openness also refers to the role of Foreign Direct Investment in the economy. Though Japan 
and South Korea are famous examples of countries that were able to acquire international 
technology, without opening up in any important ways to foreign investment, this route is no 
longer open to most developing countries (Westphal, 2002). Since the 1970s, FDI is one of 
the key channels of technology acquisition. It has played a very positive role in countries with 
sufficiently developed absorptive capacities. The volume and impact of FDI have increased 
tremendously. The more developed its absorptive capacities, the more a country will profit 
from FDI. The less developed the absorptive capacity of a country, the more exploitative will 
the role of foreign capital be. 
 
• Trade regime: Reducing protectionism 
The evidence that trade openness is positively linked to economic success is mixed. Some 
studies see a connection between openness and growth, other (e.g. Fagerberg and Srholec, 
2006) question the direct correlation between indicators of openness and growth. This finding 
is not so surprising and reflects the historical poverty of cross-country regression methods. 
Why is the evidence so mixed? 
 
First, in almost all cases of economic success, outward orientation was preceded by a period 
of closure, protectionism and import substitution. The only exceptions that come to mind are 
the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore, which were simply too small to depend on their 
domestic markets. For most successful developing countries, import substitution did provide 
the time required for learning the basics of industrialisation. There are few examples of 
developing countries which started exporting manufactured goods from scratch. 
 
Examples of formerly inward-looking economies which turned outwards include South 
Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, India, China and Indonesia. In this respect, the much maligned 
import substitution has played a positive role in the economic history of the presently 
economically more successful developing countries. The present emphasis in the world trade 
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negotiations on unconditional trade liberalisation by the poorest developing countries 
disregards the positive role that protection has played in the past (Chang, 2002). 
 
In the second place, the outward orientation of the successful East Asian economies has not 
been synonymous with import liberalisation and reduced levels of industrial protection. In 
spite of the smoke screens thrown up in the ambiguous World Bank study, The East Asian 
Miracle (1993), policy interventions and import protection continued to play and important 
role in most of the successful Asian economies (except in laissez-fair Hong Kong). 
 
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that protectionist policies nurture inefficiency, waste 
and economic stagnation, by reducing incentives for competition. This has had detrimental 
effects in both Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In China, the protected state enterprises 
continue to be a burden on the overall economy. The sooner economies exposed their firms to 
the discipline of the market, the more they profited from the learning effects of the preceding 
period of import substitution. The later the turn outwards, the more the inefficiency generating 
effects of protection predominated. The acceleration of growth in China and India was 
unmistakably accompanied by a shift towards a more-outward looking stance in trade policy, 
reduced protection and an increase in competitive pressures. Economic stagnation in Africa 
and Latin America is associated with continued protection which was conducive to 
inefficiency and rent seeking behaviour. 
 
• Financial openness 
Not all forms of openness are beneficial for growth and development. Since the financial 
crises of the 1990s, in particular the Asian crisis of 1997, a convincing case has been made for 
retaining some measure of control over short term capital flows, to avoid extreme 
destabilisation in globalised financial markets (Stiglitz, 2000, 2002; Tobin, Eichengreen, 
2000). Premature financial openness makes developing countries with underdeveloped 
financial markets and shaky banking systems more vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
• International trade policies 
In the longer run, international trade policy and reduced restrictions on international trade 
achieved in successive GATT negotiation rounds have had positive effects on industrialisation 
in developing countries and have contributed in major ways to their increased access to 
developed country markets. The great exception has been agricultural protection, which has 
continued almost unabated to the present day to the detriment of the primary export prospects 
of developing countries, whether of the poorest LDCs in Africa or the more affluent Latin 
American countries. 
 
• Liberalisation, deregulation and market orientation 
In long-run perspective it is unmistakable that acceleration of growth in Asia has been 
accompanied by economic liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and the turn towards 
markets, for instance in countries like China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand. In 
Africa, liberalisation initially led to further economic decline, deindustrialisation and 
stagnation as non-competitive parastatals were exposed to international competition. In Latin 
America, the record of liberalisation has been mixed, primarily because liberalisation of trade, 
finance and domestic markets led to increased macroeconomic instability in countries such as 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. 
 
State-led growth was able to achieve substantial rates of capital accumulation in the post-war 
period in Brazil, Mexico, India and China, Soviet Russia, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya. But it 
 27
failed to deliver sustained growth, as planned economies were too inflexible and rigid to 
respond to increasingly rapid changes in domestic and international demand, in technology 
and in the global division of labour. State-led policies may be appropriate for rapid capital 
accumulation in the initial stages of industrial development but not for total factor 
productivity growth and technological upgrading. For sub-Saharan Africa, one can conclude 
without any hesitation that state intervention, nationalisations and forced industrialisation 
policies stifled growth after promising beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s. 
  
• Industrial and technology policies 
The Asian Miracle (1993) attempted to reinterpret the Southeast Asian economic success as 
the result of outward orientation and market-friendly policies. But the conclusions of the 
study contradicted many of the interesting chapters included in the book, which gave ample 
evidence of the heavily interventionist nature of economic policies in most of these 
economies. This has since been confirmed in a whole range of studies which definitively 
confirm the interventionist nature of East Asian economic policy (Westphal 2002; Amsden 
1989; Wade 1990). Economic policy was not simply directed at import liberalisation and 
market liberalisation. On the contrary, high rates of protection were maintained and key 
sectors, conglomerates and even enterprises were supported and subsidised. The key purpose 
of policy interventions was technological learning. 
 
Science, technology and educational policy acted as a supplement to economic policy. 
Industrial policy was oriented towards upgrading and the shift from traditional low-tech 
sectors such as textiles to high-tech sectors such as electronics. Technology policy was 
directed at improving domestic research capacity, improving human capital and acquiring 
international technology. Technology policy and industrial policy interacted to promote 
learning, acquisition of technological capabilities and absorptive capacity. Thus the choice to 
invest in a given sector such as electronics in Malaysia was not only determined by immediate 
economic prospects, but also by long-run learning prospects.  
 
In Kicking Away the Ladder, Chang (2002), argues that in the present-day orthodox liberal 
world economic order, the developing countries in Africa and Latin America that are seeking 
to emulate the experiences of the Asian countries, are deprived of the tools and instruments 
which contributed to success in the past, such as some degree of protection and interventionist 
technology and industrial policies. Chang’s conclusions are logical and derive from a realistic 
interpretation of policies in Asia. Nevertheless, his policy advice is not without risk for Latin 
America and even more so for sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa it is clear that state policies themselves have been among the main 
sources of economic stagnation. In this context, one should be wary of anything that increases 
the discretionary power of the state apparatus. State policies have contributed to the 
destruction of agriculture in countries that had food surpluses at the eve of their independence. 
State policies have led to forced industrialisation strategies that have been a failure across the 
board and resulted in industries with a negative contribution to GDP at world prices. State 
policies have squandered natural resources and riches in a wide range of countries. Thirty 
years of industrial protection has not resulted in sufficient learning experiences. On the 
contrary, it has created deeply inefficient parastatal enterprises which were unable to compete 
in a liberalised setting and which melted down when protection was abolished (For Tanzania 
see Van Engelen et al., 2001).  
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Given the institutional quality of the state apparatus in Africa, it is likely that the present trend 
towards liberalisation and withdrawal of the state from the economy may be the best of bad 
options. There are some indications that after 10 years of deindustrialization in East Africa, 
some countries such are starting to experience some recovery, including countries such as 
Zambia, Tanzania or Mozambique which are starting to profit from inflows of foreign direct 
investment and accelerated growth since 2000 (e.g. Portelli, 2006). At a later stage, if and 
when the quality of governance and government institutions has also improved in Africa, one 
might revisit the debate reopened by Chang. But, not at this moment. 
 
My conclusion is that the debate concerning industrial and technology policy and the use of 
instruments of protection cannot be separated from the debate about the quality of government 
institutions. The more effective government institutions, the more scope there is for policy 
interventions. It is also relevant for the policy debate that the acceleration of growth in China, 
India and Indonesia in the nineties was associated on balance with a marked trend towards 
deregulation, privatisations and a strengthening of market forces.  
 
• Avoiding Aid Dependence 
Foreign aid is not a major determinant of successful economic growth and development. 
Never in economic history have inflows of aid been responsible for a country’s turnaround 
from stagnation to growth and catch up. Ultimately, growth and socio-economic development 
can only be realised through internal efforts, entrepreneurship, policies and internal dynamics. 
At best, the positive effects of aid on growth and development are marginal. 
 
In the absence of endogenous growth dynamics, the impact of aid on poverty reduction is 
limited. Rapid reductions of the number of people below absolute poverty lines can only be 
achieved in the context of rapid growth of per capita incomes, as in present day China, India, 
Vietnam or in Indonesia under the Suharto regime. 
 
Nevertheless, aid flows can supplement domestic savings and commercial financial flows. In 
a favourable context, they can contribute to the alleviation of bottlenecks in development. 
Thus aid flows have contributed to breakthroughs in agricultural research and to the diffusion 
of new agricultural technologies. Aid flows have financed improvements in infrastructure. 
They have contributed in important ways to expansion of educational systems in developing 
countries, which are important investment in human capital accumulation. Well-targeted aid 
flows can also contribute to the realisation of limited but important developmental goals, such 
as the eradication of river blindness, tuberculosis, treatment and prevention of aids or malaria, 
improving sanitation and water supply or the diffusion of contraceptive techniques and birth 
control methods. But of course in the long run, a developing country will only be able to 
finance its own health and social service infrastructure if it improves its productive 
capabilities. In the absence of this, the country eternally continues to be dependent on aid 
flows. 
 
 Aid can become counterproductive when aid flows allow governments to continue 
ineffective and economically destructive agricultural and industrial policies, which they 
would not have been able to sustain in the absence of aid flows. Aid also becomes 
counterproductive when aid flows are too large as a percentage of GDP. There is a potential 
negative effect of very large inflows of aid, which have a distorting influence on 
entrepreneurial incentives. The latent resources of innovativeness and entrepreneurship 
increasingly become diverted from productive investment. Human creative becomes geared 
towards gaining access to aid resources, subsidies and aid projects. There is no hard empirical 
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evidence for the threshold level beyond which aid flows start having a negative impact on the 
long-run prospects of growth and dynamism. Hermes and Lensink (2001) argue for an 
unrealistically high 50 percent threshold beyond which the marginal returns to aid decline. 
My working hypothesis is that a sustained inflow of aid beyond a threshold level of around 7-
10 percent of GDP will seriously sap the long-run productive potential of a country. 
 
From this perspective, one has to be deeply sceptical about the realisation of the millennium 
development goals and critical of the hype surrounding them. After his enthusiastic 
contribution to big bang theories of rapid transition to the market which have contributed to 
economic disaster in the Russian Federation, Jeffrey Sachs, the auctor intellectualis of the 
Millennium Goals, now wants to save the world, preferably within ten years. Lessons from 
past experiences with aid-driven big push strategies are being disregarded (Easterly, 2006). 
This will almost inevitably lead to new disappointments. The proposed doubling of aid flows 
to sub-Saharan Africa - if it ever takes place - will not lead to more rapid growth in the 
absence of improved absorptive capacities. Therefore, it will also not lead to poverty 
reduction. This is irrespective of the number of poverty reduction strategy papers desperate 
government officials in African countries are forced to draft by international agencies.  
 
A possible exception to this pessimistic scenario might be when aid takes the form of large-
scale debt relief. Some of the poorest countries have borrowed themselves into situations 
where debt overhang acts as a disincentive to any kind of economic effort. Reckless lending 
by international financial institutions and private banks has contributed to this situation. 
Therefore, at least part of the responsibility for indebtedness lies with these institutions. Past 
attempts at debt restructuring were often no more than attempts to bail out the global system 
of financial institutions, by refinancing developing country debt, while maintaining their 
indebtedness. Large-scale debt relief for the poorest countries could clear the deck for a fresh 
start. There is some evidence that some of the poorest countries are now benefiting from the 
HIPC initiative. Financial flows associated with debt relief do not have the distorting effects 
on entrepreneurial effort discussed above.  
 
Debt relief does presume prior changes in the nature and transparency of policy making. If 
these changes are not forthcoming, debt relief will simply reward ineffective policies and 
allow for their continuation by the same elites that were responsible for the failures of the 
past. It discriminates against countries, which have followed more prudent borrowing 
policies. 
6.3 Ultimate sources 
In the light of our rejection of mono-causal explanations, generalising about the ultimate 
sources of growth is perhaps the hardest of all. Here I discuss a number of the key factors 
from the literature. 
 
• Scientific and technological advance  
Long-run changes in science and technology are among the ultimate sources of increases in 
productive capacity. The locus of such change is in the most advanced economies of the 
world economic order. From there technological change spreads and diffuses to those 
developing countries that have sufficient absorptive capacity to profit from global 
technological change. But scientific and technological advance itself depends on the 
institutional and cultural incentives for intellectual and inventive effort and the resources 
invested in the progress of knowledge. It is thus entangled with other ultimate factors. 
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The rate of scientific and technological change is accelerating. From the perspective of 
developing countries this is a double-edged sword. For some countries technological change 
creates new opportunities for catch up and even technological leapfrogging. Thus, rapid 
advances in communication and information technology in the post-war period allow for the 
emergence of global production chains and the rapid outsourcing of large parts of 
manufacturing production to developing countries. On balance, this has had tremendous 
advantages for developing countries. In the service sector, technological change creates 
unexpected new opportunities for developing countries, such as the outsourcing of call 
centres, administrative work and soft-ware programming which were not available in earlier 
periods. Rapid advances in biotechnology create opportunities for breakthroughs in 
agricultural production and health care of which some countries have availed themselves. 
 
But the acceleration of technological change creates increasing problems for those countries 
which are falling behind and do not have the absorptive capacity to tap into global change. 
Such countries are in danger of becoming even more marginalised and stagnant than they 
already were. These issues will be taken up again in the final section of this paper. 
 
• Initial conditions: Prior productivity increases in agriculture 
Prior productivity increases in agriculture are among the initial conditions facilitating the 
emergence of industry in a developing country. Productivity increases in agriculture create a 
surplus available for investment (Timmer, 1988). Productivity increase in agriculture releases 
resources for industrialisation in the early stages of industrialisation, without endangering 
domestic food production. Countries illustrating this phenomenon include post-war Korea and 
Taiwan, Japan in the late nineteenth century, Britain in the eighteenth century, China after 
1978. African agriculture is a negative case in point. Low productivity in traditional 
agriculture provided an inauspicious starting point for the African industrialisation drive in 
the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
• Initial conditions: Historically determined initial levels of economic and social inequality  
In the post-war period, lower initial levels of economic inequality of income and land 
ownership create a more favourable setting for growth. Extreme inequality constrains the size 
of domestic markets, creates perverse economic incentives and sets the stage for political 
instability. The Iberian colonial legacy of embedded inequality in Latin America has created 
institutional barriers to the participation of larger proportions of the population in the growth 
process. This inequality is the latent source for the periodic emergence of populist 
movements, which have followed growth-destroying policies. On the other hand, radical land 
reform in both China and Taiwan created a more equal initial situation in the fifties which was 
conducive to subsequent growth.  
 
• Political stability and the emergence of pacified nation-states. 
Political pacification and the emergence of stable nation-states is one of the most important 
ultimate sources of economic growth. As emphasized by Max Weber, without a stable 
national monopoly of the means of violence, centralisation and standardisation of regulation 
within the nation-state, the predictability which is required for long-term investment and 
entrepreneurship is lacking. Political instability, wars and ethnic conflict are amongst the most 
important sources of economic stagnation, as evidenced by current conflicts in Somalia, 
Sudan, Pakistan, Iraq and Congo, to name but a few examples. 
 
The present sources of economic stagnation in many African and Asian countries are not 
primarily economic in nature. Rather they refer to the absence of political centralisation, 
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standardisation and the evolution of a stable national monopoly on the means of violence. 
Both cross-country regression studies and historical studies point to the overwhelming 
importance of the existence of a stable national political framework for economic activity. 
 
In Africa, borders only recently drawn by colonial rulers in the late nineteenth century 
frequently do not coincide with cultural and ethnic traditions. The legitimacy of the central 
state institutions in multi-ethnic states is weak. The instability of present-day states in turn is 
also influenced by pre-colonial political history. Though more and more is being discovered 
about ancient African empires, we conclude that the degree of political centralisation in 
African history was far weaker than in other historical settings. The impact of central rule on 
everyday life was more modest and large numbers of people lived in tribal and acephalic 
political settings. One of the key factors distinguishing Latin America and in particular Asia 
from Africa is a far longer and more pervasive historical experience with centralised political 
rule. 
 
The lack of internal stability in African states is compounded by external intervention by 
outside powers each supporting their ethnic clients and exacerbating internal conflict. Thus, 
for much of the post-war period Africa was the arena of cold-war conflict by proxy. Since the 
end of the cold war, African nations themselves have increasingly intervened in other African 
countries (e.g. in Congo, and West Africa).  
 
• The quality of political institutions.  
Where the legitimacy of state institutions and the nation-state is weak, the stage is set for the 
emergence of states which rule on behalf of specific ethnic groups or class interests. In such 
settings, state economic policy is almost exclusively aimed at maintaining the power of the 
ruling group or class, at the expense of other segments of society. For Africa, the term 
‘predatory state’ has been coined for political systems which are almost exclusively oriented 
to keep the strong man in power, such as Zaire’s Mobutu or Zimbabwe’s Mugabe. Other 
observers refer to these phenomena as the ‘neo-patrimonial state’ (Sandbrook, 1986; Bratton 
and van de Walle, 1997).  
 
The predatory state is an extreme pole of the dimension of the quality of political governance. 
But, the quality of state institutions also depends on bureaucratic capabilities, the degree of 
insulation of the bureaucracy from pressure groups (e.g. South Korea as a positive example) 
and the regulative burden claimed for governments. One of the most interesting paradoxes of 
post-war socio-economic development is the existence of weak states with disproportionately 
heavy economic tasks and a wide range of discretionary powers. The absence of bureaucratic 
traditions and experience, low remuneration of civil servants, the use of the state apparatus as 
an instrument for holding on to power and the discretionary powers all contributed to the 
institutionalisation of corruption. The present worldwide shift towards a more limited role for 
the state in economic development should not interpreted solely in economic terms, but 
against this wider backdrop of potentially venal state institutions. From this perspective, the 
present resurgence of structuralist theories calling for renewed interventionism and state 
activism should be viewed critically.  
  
• Corruption 
In cross-country regressions, corruption (and institutional quality) is often identified as a key 
determinant of economic development. But differences in corruption cannot explain why 
some countries stagnate and others develop. In some economies the proceeds of corruption 
are reinvested productively. In others they are stashed in Swiss banks, or frittered away on 
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golden shoes or golden palaces. Nigeria has been emasculated by corruption, but corruption 
under the new order of Suharto in Indonesia was compatible with thirty years of dynamism, 
between 1966 and 1997. It is a major puzzle why Suharto was able to respond so effectively 
to the economic crisis of 1984, in spite of widespread corruption, while corruption contributed 
to an inadequate Indonesian policy response to the Asian crisis of 1997 (Temple, 2003). The 
Texan robber barons of the nineteenth century were deeply corrupt, but nonetheless very 
dynamic. China’s pervasive corruption does not stand in the way of its impressive economic 
dynamics. On the basis of these examples one might somewhat provocatively advance the 
proposition that some types of corruption are economically sustainable.  
 
As an aside, it is customary to criticise developing countries for their pervasive corruption, 
but this often rather hypocritical and paternalistic. In the Western capitalist economies large-
scale corruption has been institutionalised in the form of the extortionate mutual remuneration 
by small clique of top managers and directors, who are accountable to no one. They siphon 
away immense riches in the form of bonuses, severance pay and stock options that have no 
relation to risk or performance whatsoever. This enrichment proceeds at the expense of the 
customers, the shareholders, the employees, the firms and society at large. The main 
difference with developing countries is that these managers operate within the law. They have 
succeeded in legalising corruption. This does not show up on the corruption indexes of 
transparency international, which are used for international comparisons. Though the case of 
Enron amply illustrates the potentially destructive effects of this kind of institutionalised 
corruption, it has so far not formed a serious obstacle to the dynamics of the leading 
economies. 
 
• Democracy and economic development. 
 There is a highly charged debate about the relationship between democratic institutions and 
economic development. Is democratisation a factor contributing to economic development, or 
is it an obstacle? In the post-war period, there are examples of democratic countries such as 
India which have achieved a measure of economic success, but there are just as many 
examples of dictatorial or autocratic states with strong development drives, such as Singapore, 
Taiwan, South Korea, China or Vietnam. Autocratic states potentially allow for the insulation 
of economic policy making from pressure groups and interest groups, such as was the case in 
South Korea. 
 
It is sometimes argued that democratic politics have a negative effect on economic growth in 
developing countries, because populist measures will inhibit long-term processes of 
accumulation (e.g. Barro, 1996). But, autocratic institutions also increase the risk that, in the 
absence of checks and balances, major policy mistakes will be catastrophic, such as in 
China’s great leap backwards from 1958 to 1960, Mugabe’s single handed destruction of the 
economy of Zimbabwe or North Korea’s maintenance of a starving garrison state. 
 
Cross-country regressions provide mixed evidence about the effects of democracy on 
economic development, as seems inevitable with this type of econometric research. One of the 
older survey articles (Helliwell, 1994) rightly concludes that democracy is neither a 
prerequisite for nor an obstacle to economic development. What causality there is works the 
other way round. As countries advance economically, their citizens tend to prefer more 
democratic institutions. An optimistic interpretation of this finding is that while 
democratisation is not a condition for economic development, there is no reason why 
successfully developing economies could not become more democratic. 
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• Institutions 
Institutions and institutional quality are increasingly mentioned as important determinants of 
development. But it is hard to go beyond description and examples to generalise about how 
institutions affect growth and development. The most general formulation is still that of North 
and Thomas (1973), who argue that institutions that align individual interests with social 
welfare are conducive to economic development. In their analysis, well-defined property 
rights have been crucial for Western European economic development. The extent to which 
property rights are protected depends in turn on the balance between state power and the 
power of entrepreneurial groups. State formation and state power are important in establishing 
and maintaining property rights, but excessive state power will stifle entrepreneurial 
freedoms. Other important innovations with regard to property rights focus on the emergence 
of joint stock companies, which limit individual risk and liabilities.  
 
Property rights affect both rates of accumulation and rates of innovation. Without well-
defined and well-enforced property rights, entrepreneurial individuals have little incentive to 
take a long view and to invest in future growth. In the same way, protection of intellectual 
property rights allows inventors to enjoy the fruits of their innovative efforts. However, the 
focus on protection of intellectual property rights has also been criticised. Some types of 
innovation are based more on collective invention, than individually patented inventions. 
Thus, there seem to be alternative ways to align individual interests with collective growth 
and dynamism. Also some types of accumulation can successfully be performed by states 
rather than by private entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the focus of North and Thomas on 
alignment or misalignment of incentives through economic institutions continues to be a very 
promising line of analysis.  
 
• Cultural Factors: Work ethic, savings and entrepreneurship 
Though monocausal cultural explanations of development which relate economic 
development to specific religions or cultures have largely been debunked, one can identify 
some common attitudinal characteristics in successful developers, which are rooted in culture. 
These elements include a strong work ethic and social discipline, a high value placed on 
education and learning, attitudes conducive to high savings rates, low levels of risk aversion 
and positive attitudes towards entrepreneurship. Both Protestantism and the Confucian ethic 
value sobriety, hard work and savings. 
 
Thus, attitudes can evolve in very different religious and cultural contexts, such as Puritan 
Protestantism, modernistic Islam or Confucianism, but they do seem to be important in the 
context of economic development. Of course, cultural traits are neither exogenous, nor 
immutable. When incentives change and new opportunities arise, older cultural adaptations to 
economic stagnant circumstances will start to change. But, cultural traits do emerge from very 
long historical experiences and adaptations and change only slowly.  
 
The role of extended family ties in economic development illustrates the ambiguity of cultural 
factors. On the one hand, there is a large older literature focusing on the negative influence of 
extended family obligations on entrepreneurship and investment. Entrepreneurial success 
results in redistributive obligations which are an obstacle to further entrepreneurial success. 
On the other hand, there is a recent literature on the positive functions of family ties in East 
Asia as a resource for capital accumulation and entrepreneurship.   
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• Cultural factors: Developmental drive 
In historical examples of successful catch up, a factor which comes to the fore is 
‘developmental drive’. This refers to an interplay between political elites who define 
developmental goals (as the Meiji reformers in Japan, the leaders of China’s present capitalist 
drive, Suharto’s new order, or a variety of post-war nationalist regimes) and feelings of 
national pride and resentment at the present position of the nation in the international order.  
 
• Cultural Factors: Openness to the outside world 
One of the key cultural attitudes favourable to successful development is openness to the 
outside world. This involves a willingness and eagerness to acquire and assimilate technology 
and knowledge from leading countries in the world economy, whichever they are. When a 
society turns inwards and rejects outside influences as either inferior or too threatening, or 
when a society cultivates too much resentment against these influences, it will tend to 
stagnate. Such attitudes help explain the loss of momentum of the early European leaders 
Portugal and Spain from the sixteenth century onwards when religion became dogmatic and 
anti-scientific, the long centuries of Chinese stagnation after the fourteenth century, China’s 
failure to catch up in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century, as opposed to Japanese 
success, and economic stagnation in the post-war Middle Eastern world.15  
 
But it is not clear whether the openness to the outside world is a deep-seated cultural trait of a 
country’s whole population. Rather, openness tends to depend on cultural traits of dominant 
elites. When China turned inward in the fifteenth century, this was primarily the outcome of a 
power struggle between the court mandarins and the eunuch admirals, which was won by the 
former. 
 
• Climate, soil conditions and energy and mineral resources 
Geographic determinists such as Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs et al., 2004) and Jared Diamond (1998) 
argue that geographic factors such as climate, soil conditions, mineral locations and distance 
from continental coastline are important ultimate determinants of growth and stagnation. 
Thus, moderate climate, location on the seaboard, fertile soils and resources such as coal, oil, 
gas or minerals are seen as determining the chances of developmental success.  
 
The claims for geography are overstated in the context of the modern world. Geographic 
conditions do not determine success or failure in development. For every factor mentioned by 
the determinists, there are powerful counterexamples. Nowadays, many tropical countries and 
regions with intemperate climates show very rapid growth. Resource poor countries such as 
Japan and Korea have experienced spectacular catch up. There are many examples of very 
prosperous landlocked economies such as Switzerland, Austria, Southern Germany or 
Botswana and of stagnating seaboard economies such as Eritrea or Tanzania. In the post-war 
period, oil riches have more often been a negative source of growth than a positive one. 
 
In his more nuanced formulation of proximate and ultimate causality, Rodrik argues that 
geographic conditions are part of ultimate causality, because they determine the geographic 
conditions that people in a country have to grapple with. Thus they influence the path of 
development a country follows. Policies and human actions have somehow or other to take 
into account location factors, resource availability, climatic conditions and soil conditions. 
                                                 
15 In this sense, the present revival of flat-earth thinking and anti-Darwinian religious fundamentalism in the 
USA bodes badly for future US economic leadership.  
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But, this does not mean that one or another of these factors is a decisive determinant of 
development success of failure in itself.  
 
• Demographic trends 
Demographic trends are important amongst the more ultimate sources of economic 
development. The pace and nature of economic development is influenced by population size 
(the pattern of development of countries with large internal markets differs from that of small 
Island economies), population density, rates of population growth and dependency ratios 
which affect rates of capital accumulation. In China and India, vast populations result in large 
internal markets which contribute to acceleration of growth once domestic incomes start to 
increase even modestly. In many sub-Saharan African countries, population growth has 
exceeded growth of GDP since 1973, resulting in stagnating per capita incomes. Population 
growth has also exceeded the rate of technological change in agriculture. As a result 
diminishing returns to traditional agricultural practices have resulted in stagnation of food 
production. 
 
Demographic trends, by the way, illustrate the circularity of processes of development. 
Demographic trends affect economic development in a variety of ways, through labour 
supply, age structure and pressure on resources. But, economic development and social 
modernisation in turn result in a reduction of birth rates and a slowdown in population 
growth, which create windows of opportunity before the aging of populations starts exerting 
negative effects on growth prospects. 
 
Ester Boserup has made a convincing case for the importance of demographic trends as driver 
of economic growth and technological change (Boserup, 1965, 1981). Her argument, in a 
nutshell, is that increasing population densities with given production technologies result in 
increasing pressure on resources and diminishing returns. They also create incentives for 
technological advance and intensive cultivation practices in agriculture and technological 
change in general, which may more than counteract diminishing returns. Success in 
development occurs when the localised race between technological change and population 
growth is won by technology. Factor proportions may influence both the nature of economic 
development and the direction of technological changes, as argued by the induced innovation 
hypothesis (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). An example of the importance of factor proportions is 
the way in which surplus labour in East Asia has contributed to the success of labour intensive 
manufacturing.  
 
Though Boserup argues that the link between population and technological growth is 
weakening since the end of the nineteenth century, due to improvements in transport and 
communication technology, it can still be seen to operate in the post-war period. Thus, 
productivity growth in post-war agriculture is primarily found in countries with the highest 
population densities in Asia (India, China, Indonesia), while agricultural productivity in low 
density Africa has stagnated. Densely populated urban centres are invariably the locus of 
technological advance. 
 
More generally, the anti-Malthusian argument is that increasing pressure on resources creates 
incentive for technological change, and makes technological alternatives in production and 
energy supply more viable. 
 
• The distance to the technological frontier 
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The distance to the technological frontier should also be seen as one of the ultimate sources of 
growth. The greater the technology gap, the greater the potential for rapid catch up. It defines 
the initial conditions for growth and stagnation in the post-war period (Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Abramovitz, 1989). 
 
When there is sufficient technological congruence between the technological leaders and 
followers and social capabilities and absorptive capacities are sufficiently developed, 
countries can experience explosive catch up, due to the rapid absorption of technologies 
developed elsewhere.  
 
Verspagen (1991) has argued that technological potential is not simply a linear function of the 
size of the technology gap. If the technology gap becomes too large, technological congruence 
will decline and, given a certain level of social capabilities (learning capabilities, absorptive 
capacity), it becomes more difficult for countries to catch up. 
 
• Absorptive Capacities. 
Though knowledge has an inherent tendency to flow and diffuse, catch up is not automatic. 
Otherwise than argued by Veblen, absorption of technology is far from easy. It is more than 
simple imitation. It involves effort, creativity, organisational innovation and technological 
adaptation (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2006). Absorbing international knowledge and 
technology requires a highly developed absorptive capacity, which does not come free of 
charge. While lead countries in the world economy need to invest in advancing the frontiers 
of knowledge, follower countries in the developing world primarily have to invest in 
improving their absorptive capacities. Only when they start moving closer to the technological 
frontier, will they need to reorient their efforts and policies to knowledge production. This has 
happened in Korea and is presently happening in China and India. 
 
One of the reasons why absorption of technology is more than simple transfer of technology is 
that successful technology transfer almost always involves adaptation to local circumstances, 
institutions and conditions. Both the mastery and the adaptation of technology require 
considerable effort and skill. And as economic development progresses, adaptation is replaced 
by upgrading and investment in technological advance, which requires even more skills. 
 
This notion of the difficulty of absorbing technology explains why some countries are able to 
profit from international technological advances, while others cannot and become mired in 
stagnation. As a wide range of authors have emphasized, catch up requires highly developed 
social and technological capabilities. These capabilities in turn depend on the size of the 
technology and productivity gaps. A traditional agricultural economy such as Burkina Faso 
will find it almost impossible to absorb advanced technology from the USA, Japan or Europe 
because the technological distance is simply too large. 
 
Successful catch up involves the prior investment in technological and social capabilities 
which allow countries to acquire and master international technologies. Social and 
technological capabilities include educational levels, the orientation of education, technical 
and financial skills, a disciplined workforce, institutions which stimulate entrepreneurship, 
and sufficient political and economic stability to make risk taking worth while (Abramovitz, 
1989). There is also a more micro-oriented literature deriving from authors as Sanjaya Lall 
focusing on firm level capabilities and efforts (Bell et al., 1982; Lall, 1992, 1996; Romijn, 
1999). Lall and others distinguish: production capabilities, investment capabilities and 
innovation capabilities which allow firms to adapt and further develop technologies.  
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The improvement of firm-level capabilities is a microeconomic aspect of the macro concept 
of social capabilities à la Abramovitz. A third rapidly growing body of literature which is 
relevant for absorptive capacity is the systems of innovation literature (Lundvall 1992; 
Nelson, 1993). Absorptive capacity is not determined only by the some total of the 
capabilities of the micro agents. It is also determined by the nature of the interactions between 
actors (firms, research institutions and government agencies) and the institutions influencing 
these interactions. The more effective a system of innovation, the more rapidly knowledge 
will spread within a country and the more effectively will a country be able to absorb 
technology from abroad.  
 
7 Tapping into Global Technological Advance as a Characteristic 
of Catch up Economies 
 
So, far I have discussed a wide range of proximate, intermediate and ultimate factors that 
affect economic development. At the conclusion of this paper, I would like to select a few 
elements for further discussion, which are of particular importance for our understanding of 
success and failure in development. The argument can be summarised in three propositions: 1. 
technological change is generated in the leading economies of the international economic 
order. 2. Developing countries that are able to absorb internationally generated technology 
can profit from the advantages of technological backwardness. They can experience 
accelerated catch up. Countries that are not able to absorb technology will tend to fall behind. 
3. Differences in absorptive capacity account for much of the difference between success and 
failure in economic development in the post-war period. 
 
In the present international order there is great inequality in technological efforts. An 
overwhelming proportion of scientific research and research and development activities takes 
places in the advanced economies. Technological change emanates from the lead countries in 
the world economy. 
 
Table 3:US patent activity, 1990-2004 
Year  Patents Share of patents granted (%) 
  Granted Foreign  Developing Developing 
    Patents Country Countries 
      Patents excl. S. Korea 
1990   99220 46.6 1.1 0.3 
1995 113955 43.4 2.8 0.5 
2000 176083 44.9 4.8 0.7 
2004 181322 48.1 7.0 1.0 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office, TAF Special Report, All Patents, 
All Types, January 1977-december 2004 
 
An illustration of this is provided in tables 3 and 4. As indicated in table 3, almost all patent 
applications in the USA originate in the advanced economies. Excluding South Korea, only 1 
per cent of patents granted in the USA (the technological leader) in the post-war period 
originates in developing countries. Similar patterns hold for scientific publications. Large 
multinational companies take the lead in innovation. Thus the fifty largest multinationals 
alone account from 26 per cent of all patents in the United States. According to estimates by 
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the World Health Organisation, 95 per cent of all medical research focuses on health problems 
of the advanced countries (World Bank, 1999). 
 
Table 4 provides some information about R&D efforts of developing countries in the 1990s. 
Developing countries invest a much lower proportion of GDP in research and development 
(around 0.6%) than the advanced economies (around 2.3%). The technological gaps in terms 
of R&D per head of population are even greater.  
 
Table 4: R&D Efforts, 1987-2003a 
 R&D R&D R&D R&D Scientists 
 as % of as % of per capita per capita & Engineers 
 GDP GDP PPP internat. $ PPP internat. $ per 100.000 
 1987-97 b 1997-2002 1987-97 1997-2002 1990-2003 
Bangladesh 0.3 0.3 2.9 2.9 52 
China 0.5 1.2 13.0 55.6 633 
India 0.8 0.8 9.9 20.5 120 
Indonesia 0.1 0.1 2.8 2.8 182 
Malaysia 0.3 0.7 18.0 64.1 294 
Pakistan 1.1 0.3 9.6 5.1 88 
Philippines 0.2 0.2 6.2 6.2 157 
South Korea 2.9 2.9 285.0 494.8 2979 
Sri Lanka 0.2 0.2 1.8 1.8 197 
Taiwan 2.1 2.1  2.1 544 
Thailand 0.1 0.2 8.4 16.9 289 
Turkey 0.4 0.2 21.6 42.2 345 
      
Argentina 0.4 0.4 33.9 42.2 715 
Brazil 0.7 1.0 34.9 76.9 324 
Chile 0.7 0.5 74.9 51.9 419 
Colombia 0.1 0.2 3.7 10.5 81 
Mexico 0.3 0.4 23.4 37.8 259 
Peru 0.6 0.1 24.2 5.2 225 
Venezuela 0.5 0.4 41.2 20.9 222 
      
Egypt 0.5 0.2 11.1 6.9 459 
Nigeria 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 15 
South Africa 0.7 0.7 43.1 69.5 192 
Zambia  0.01   47 
      
Average Asia 0.8 0.8 34.5 59.6 490.0 
Average Latin 
America 
0.5 0.4 33.7 35.1 321 
Average 
developing 
countries 
0.6 0.6 31.9 47.1 384.2 
      
Average advanced 
economies  
2.1 2.3 438.2 673.4 3785 
Sources: 
R&D expenditures developing countries from Unesco Statistical Yearbook (1999). R&D and 
R&D as percentage of GDP in OECD countries from OECD, Science, Technology and Industry 
Outlook, 1998. Scientists and engineers from UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001-2005. 
Notes: 
a. Latest year in period for which data are available. 
b. The definition of R&D in Unesco statistics on developing countries is more inclusive than the 
statistics for OECD countries from the Science Technology and Industry Outlook, 1998, which 
conform to Frascati manual definitions. 
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Given the location of technological advance, catch up in the post-1950 globalised economy is 
only possible if developing countries develop the capabilities to acquire, master and adapt 
international technology. There is not a single example of successful catch up since the late 
nineteenth century which did not involve tapping into international technology – e.g. 
Germany, Russia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, China and India. The 
countries that, for some reason or other, are not able or not willing to tap into global 
technology flows, are the countries that are falling behind and are becoming marginalised in 
the world economy. 
 
For this reason, the romantic myth of indigenous or traditional technology is potentially 
dangerous for development. The myth of indigenous technology suggests that there exists 
something like an appropriate, indigenous technology which is more adapted to the needs and 
traditions of the developing countries. Such technologies are usually small scale, 
environmentally friendly, integrated into traditional culture and so forth. In the light of the 
forgoing analysis, this is a recipe for economic stagnation. One can think of Mahatma 
Ghandi's preoccupation with small-scale spinning, Mao Zedong’s campaign for backyard 
steel ovens or the Chinese ambivalence towards Western technology around 1900. But one 
can also think of present day aid workers’ love of small water pumps, solar panels and other 
‘appropriate’ technological solutions. To avoid misunderstandings, I am not arguing that some 
of these technologies may not be useful. I am arguing that they will not provide the 
momentum for growth and catch up that are required to lift millions of people out of poverty.  
 
The myth disregards the fact that economic catch up is a vast and cataclysmic process 
involving rapid and destructive economic and technological change. If one travels through 
present-day South East Asia, one see whole provinces being dug up and transformed (and 
polluted).  
 
In developing countries with fairly well developed social and technological capabilities there 
are ample opportunities for rapid catch up. If such capabilities are weak or absent, than 
countries will become increasingly marginalised and exploited. Thus one can see the 
technology and productivity race as the outcome of two contradictory tendencies. Innovation 
in the lead countries leads to increased global inequality and falling behind of developing 
countries. Diffusion and transfer of technology allows for explosive growth and catch up in 
some of the developing countries, with sufficient absorptive capacities. 
 
Thus, in a modern interdependent economic order, the factor that best distinguishes countries 
that succeed in catching up, from those that do not, are differences in absorptive capacity. The 
key sources of catch up in developing countries are absorptive capacity and ability and 
willingness to tap into global technology. When a country has developed the capacity to 
absorb and adapt technology and has the eagerness and drive to do so, it can grow at an 
astounding rate as evidenced by several Asian countries in the post-war period. The 
Gerschenkronian advantages of backwardness allow a country to profit from technological 
advance, without bearing many of the costs and risks.  
 
Countries that are hesitant to open themselves to global technological change and associated 
outside influences, for political, cultural or religious reasons, do this at their peril, as 
evidenced by the divergent patterns of development of Japan and China from the late 
nineteenth century till 1950. Either a country goes all out in its attempts to acquire and 
assimilate international technology or it will stagnate.  
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At first sight, this emphasis on absorptive capacities would seem to boil down to just another 
of the monocausal explanations, I rejected earlier. But this is misleading. I have argued that 
technological advance needs to be complemented by a great variety of proximate, 
intermediate and ultimate factors. Also, we saw that there is not one single explanation of how 
absorptive capacities emerge. The evolution of absorptive capacities depends on a 
complicated multicausal mix of ultimate cultural and institutional factors and intermediate 
policy efforts The focus on absorptive capacities and the conditions for tapping into 
international technology flows, helps us in setting our future research priorities in the analysis 
of success and failure in economic development.  
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